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This study analyzes the long-term effect of labor market 
institutions, such as minimum wage and union density, on 
inequality, investment, growth, and consumption, by using data 
of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development since the 1970s. Labor market 
institution variables are used to test arguments on wage-led growth 
theory.
Panel cointegration approach was used to investigate the long-
term effect of these variables. Results of panel cointegration test 
show that variables of labor market institutions are not robustly 
correlated to macroeconomic outcomes in the long run. This 
condition is not in accordance with the findings of the proponents 
and critics of wage-led growth. No robust evidence exists to 
show that increasing minimum wage and union density, which 
are representative policies for wage-led growth, are correlated to 
inequality, labor income share, consumption, investment, or growth 
in the long run. Estimation results of this study suggest that the 
empirical basis of support and criticism for wage-led growth theory 
is weak.
Keywords:  Wage-led growth, Minimum wage, Union density, Panel 
cointegration
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I. Introduction
The last global financial crisis from 2007 to 2008 placed the global 
economy into a deep depression. Moreover, many traditional economic 
perspectives were changed. One of these perspectives is the wage-led 
growth strategy proposed by Lavoie and Stockhammer (2012). Wage is 
a cost item from the firm viewpoint in traditional economics. However, 
this perspective emphasizes wage as a source of workers’ income and 
argues that increasing wages or wage share can increase GDP or its 
growth rate while decreasing income inequality.
This theory is attractive to politicians because it argues for the 
possibility of simultaneously achieving important economic and 
social goals, which are growth and equality. Consequently, several 
politicians and governments in developed countries, such as the Obama 
Administration in the US and the Abe Administration in Japan, have 
conducted similar policies on the basis of wage-led growth theory. In 
addition, the Korean government, which began in May 2017, considers 
wage-led growth1 as one of its key policy objectives. 
A representative policy for wage-led growth is an increase in 
minimum wage. This policy is widely applied because it directly affects 
the income of low-paid workers and is relatively easy to implement 
compared with other policies, such as increase in union density or wage 
bargaining coverage. Since the global financial crisis, the US increased 
its federal hourly minimum wage from $5.15 in 2006 to $7.25 in 2009, 
and Japan increased its minimum wage from 713 yen in 2010 to 823 
yen in 2017. Korea also increased its hourly minimum wage from 3,100 
won in 2006 to 8,350 won in 2019.
Although wage-led growth is popular nowadays, only few studies test 
the effect of policies from wage-led growth on macro-economic outcomes. 
In the present study, the long-term effect of labor market institutions, 
such as minimum wage and union density, on macroeconomic 
outcomes, such as inequality, investment, growth, and consumption, 
was estimated using panel cointegration approach. As a result, the 
empirical basis of wage-led growth theory can be tested. In Section II, 
related literature is reviewed. In Sections III and IV, data and estimation 
1 The term “income-led growth” is frequently used in Korea to reflect a 
relatively high share of workers who are self-employed. 
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method are introduced. In Section V, estimation results are discussed. 
In Section VI, the conclusion is presented. 
II. Literature Review
A. Wage-led Growth
Wage-led growth is proposed by several scholars, particularly those at 
the International Labour Organization (Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012; 
Onaran and Galanis 2012; Stockhammer and Onaran 2013). Their 
argument is simple. The marginal propensity of consumption for wage 
earners is higher than that of profit earners; thus, the increase in wage 
share to GDP can increase aggregate consumption and demand. These 
scholars admit that the increase in wage share can decrease investment 
and net export because it can decrease the future profitability of 
firms. However, they argue that these effects are less than the effect 
on consumption in many countries. These scholars divide the demand 
regime into two, namely, wage and profit led. If the increase in wage 
share increases the private demand, then the country has a wage-led 
demand regime, whereas if the increase in wage share decreases private 
demand, then the country has a profit-led demand regime. They also 
argued that determining whether a country is in the wage- or profit-
led demand regime is an empirical issue and cannot be performed 
theoretically. For example, Onaran and Galanis (2012) conducted a 
time-series econometric analysis for 15 countries in G20 from 1961 to 
2007 and argued that Germany, France, Italy, the UK, the US, Japan, 
Turkey, and Korea have wage-led demand regimes.
Although wage-led growth theory is simple and powerful, it is 
prone to criticism. The first problem is the endogeneity of wage share. 
Skott (2017) stated that the relationship between wage share and 
economic growth can be positive with some exogenous shocks, but 
it can be negative with other exogenous shocks. The second problem 
is the direction of causality. Kuznets (1955) argued that income level 
can affect distribution. As the sectoral transition from agriculture to 
manufacturing and service has been completed, inequality can decrease 
with income in developed countries, thereby generating a positive 
correlation between wage share and GDP. Thus, identifying the effect 
of wage share on GDP using time-series regression for one country is 
difficult, as shown by Onaran and Galanis (2012). The third problem is 
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that the amount of wage share that should be increased is unclear. An 
extremely high wage share cannot be beneficial to the GDP or growth 
because no entrepreneur would invest if the wage share is 100%. Thus, 
if wage-led growth theory is correct, then an optimal wage-share level 
likely exists, but the amount of wage share that is considered optimal 
is unclear. Furthermore, this point suggests that an increase in wage 
share might not be an effective long-term growth strategy and is like a 
short-run Keynesian effective demand policy even if wage-led growth 
theory is correct. The fourth problem is that finding proper policies 
for wage-led growth is difficult even if many countries have a wage-
led demand regime, and an increase in wage share can lead to a GDP 
increase, as argued by proponents of wage-led growth. The easiest 
policy to implement is an increase in minimum wage, but whether such 
a policy increases GDP or wage share is unclear. 
B. Minimum Wage
A classical study on minimum wage is that by Card and Krueger 
(1994), who estimated the effect of minimum wage on employment in 
the fast-food industry by comparing New Jersey and Pennsylvania. 
They found that an increase in minimum wage increases fast-food 
employment rather than the opposite, as the competitive labor market 
model posits. Card and Krueger (2000) reported similar results based 
on administrative data on restaurants in these states. Card (1992) also 
showed that an increase in federal minimum wage raises the wages 
of teenage workers but does not affect employment in the US. Metcalf 
(2008) summarized similar results in the case of British minimum wage, 
which was introduced in 1999.
The aforementioned studies suggest that the labor market for low-
paid workers, which is affected by minimum wage, are more similar 
to a monopsony labor market than a competitive labor market. This 
condition is far from being a competitive labor market because most 
firms do not treat wages as given and can affect the wages to a certain 
extent. Metcalf (2008) examined 12 possible reasons for the zero to 
minimal impact of minimum wage on employment in the UK and 
suggested that five of these reasons are plausible. These reasons 
are increasing labor productivity due to increasing workers’ effort or 
training, passing on high prices of products, decreasing profit share, 
decreasing working hours per worker, and modern monopsony in which 
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competition occurs among employers, but each employer has labor 
market power2 over employees.
However, some studies have showed a negative effect of minimum 
wage on employment. For example, by using the monthly survey data 
of the current population from 1979 to 1997 in the US, Burkhauser et 
al. (2000) found a negative effect on teenage employment. Rama (2001) 
also observed a negative effect on employment in Indonesia, especially 
for small firms, by analyzing the doubled minimum wage case in the 
first half of the 1990s. Sabia et al. (2012) obtained similar results based 
on an increase in minimum wage in New York State from 2004 to 2006. 
They found that an increase in minimum wage leads to a decrease in 
employment rate for 16- to 29-year-old workers without a high school 
degree. Lee and Hwang (2016) observed a negative effect on employment 
in Korea from 2006 to 2014. This negative effect is stronger on 
vulnerable worker groups, such as young, old, or female workers, and 
workers in small businesses than other worker groups.
Studies on labor productivity have been conducted, especially in 
the UK. Forth and O’Mahoney (2003) tested the effect of national 
minimum wage on the growth rate of labor productivity and total factor 
productivity (TFP) in the UK by using 183 industry data from 1995 to 
2000 and found that these effects were insignificant. Draca et al. (2011) 
also determined a similar insignificant effect on labor productivity in 
the UK by using 4,112 firm data from 1997 to 2002. However, Riley 
and Bondibene (2015) observed significant positive effects on labor 
productivity and TFP in the UK by using firm data from 1993 to 2013. 
The researchers argued that these effects may be due to the increased 
training and efforts of workers and the organizational change resulting 
from increased labor costs. Croucher and Rizov (2012) also found a 
similar positive effect on labor productivity in low-wage sectors, such as 
retail, hospitality, social care, cleaning, security, and textiles, in the UK.
In terms of growth, theoretical studies have been conducted by 
Fanti and Gori (2011), Askenazy (2003), and Cahuc and Michel (1996). 
These studies generally suggest the possibility of positive effect of 
minimum wage on growth under certain conditions. These conditions 
are the existence of externalities related to physical or human capital 
2 Metcalf (2008) argued that this power may come from various factors, such 
as incomplete information, mobility costs, or preferences of workers.
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accumulation or R&D activities. However, the effect on growth is 
generally negative without these externalities because the minimum 
wage increases the unemployment rate in these models. 
Nevertheless, few empirical studies3 have been conducted on the 
effect of minimum wage on macroeconomic outcomes, such as wage 
share, aggregated income, or economic growth although it is the core of 
wage-led growth theory. Thus, the present study aims to fill the gap in 
the literature.  
C. Labor Unions
Previous studies using firm-level data tend to report that unions 
have a negative effect on investment and productivity growth (Denny 
and Nickell 1992; Addison and Hirsch 1989; Fernie and Metcalf 1995). 
One reason cited by previous papers is that unions capture parts of 
the expected return of investment or new technology, which reduces 
the incentive of firms’ investment. Another is that unions resist the 
introduction of new technology and change of working practices 
because union workers tend to increase their effort level and labor 
unions lose a certain degree of control over the workplace after the 
introduction of new technology.  
However, limited evidence is available on the effects of unions on 
studies using country-level data (Nickell and Layard 1999). Most 
studies do not even consider labor unions as important determinants 
of growth or productivity. Nickell and Layard (1999) argued that the 
realization of the negative effect of unions depends on management 
response. If unions and managements have a cooperative relationship, 
then the introduction of new technology might be fast due to workers’ 
cooperation. 
In terms of inequality, several studies argue that decreasing union 
density is one reason for the recent increase in wage inequality or 
top 1% income share in the US (Card 2001; Volscho and Kelly 2012). 
However, in terms of wage share, the effect of union density is not 
strong. By using country-level data, Stockhammer (2013) found a 
positive correlation between union density and wage share to GDP, but 
3 Askenazy (2003) found a positive effect of the interaction term between 
minimum wage and exports on growth using a simple panel regression in 11 
OECD countries. 
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this effect is not robust. The European Commission (EC) (2007) and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007) also observed small or non-
robust effects on wage share. Similar to studies on minimum wage, 
few empirical studies are available on the effect of union density on 
economic growth or GDP per capita using country-level data. 
III. Data 
Data for the econometric analysis are briefly discussed in this section. 
Researchers generally measure inequality on the basis of personal 
income distribution (Gini coefficient), top 1% or 10% income share, or 
functional income distribution (labor-capital income share). 
The top 10% income share in the national income, the adjusted wage 
share in GDP, and Gini coefficient were used as measures of inequality. 
Top 1% or 10% income share, as a general measure of inequality, is 
derived from administrative tax data and outperforms other available 
measures for estimating the income of the rich. Top 10% income share 
was used because this measure has numerous observations in the 
World Wealth and Income Database (WID). Income refers to the gross 
total income and includes labor, business, and capital income (excluding 
capital gains) before taxes and transfers. Adjusted wage share indicates 
the compensation per employee as a percentage of GDP at factor cost. 
The wage share data were collected from the annual macro-economic 
database (AMECO) in the EC. Gini coefficient, which was collected 
from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) 3.3, is based on the 
household disposable income and total population of the country. WIID 
grades each of these data as high, average, low, or unknown, and only 
those data with high or average quality were retained. 
Log private gross fixed capital formation (log private GFCF) per 
capita and log GDP per capita were used to measure investment and 
growth. Both are measured by using purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Private GFCF data were collected from the IMF and GDP per capita 
data from the Penn World Table (PWT) 9.0. Investment and growth 
are often measured on the basis of the ratio of investment to GDP and 
GDP growth rate. However, panel unit root tests (PURT) show that both 
measures are stationary;4 thus, they were not used in this study. The 
4 Appendix 1 presents the PURT results for these variables. 
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adopted panel cointegration approach requires the dependent variable 
to be non-stationary because the linear combination of non-stationary 
dependent and independent variables is considered stationary. If 
all variables are stationary, then cointegration becomes trivial and 
meaningless. In terms of consumption, log private consumption 
per capita, which is a household final consumption expenditure as 
measured by PPP and collected from the World Bank database, was 
used. 
As a widely used measure of minimum wage, the ratio of national (or 
federal) minimum wage to median wage of full-time workers was used. 
The related data were collected from OECD statistics. Another possible 
measure is the ratio of minimum wage to average wage, but given that 
this variable is affected by wage distribution, the ratio of minimum 
wage to median wage was used instead. 
However, Card and Krueger (1995) criticized these measures because 
they use average or median wage as denominators, which can be 
correlated to GDP per capita or unobserved economic activities. They 
propose log minimum wage as a preferred measure for minimum wage. 
However, this variable was not used in the present study because PURT 
reveals that log minimum wage is a stationary variable. Furthermore, 
the panel cointegration methods applied are robust to omitted variable 
bias, such as that resulting from the correlation between median wage 
and unobserved productivity shock. Nevertheless, a robustness check 
was conducted by using the log real hourly minimum wage. The real 
hourly minimum wage and union density data were collected from 
OECD statistics. 
When the linear combination of a set of non-stationary variables is 
stationary, these variables are “cointegrated,” that is, they are closely 
related and do not diverge from their equilibrium relationship in the 
long run.
The basic estimation equation is illustrated as follows:
 yit = αi + δit + β'xit + γ'zit + εit, (1)
where yit denotes the dependent variable, which can be the inequality 
measure, log private GFCF per capita, log GDP per capita, and log 
private consumption per capita in country i and year t, and xit refers to 
the labor market institution variable. 
zit represents a set of control variables that differ in accordance 
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with the dependent variables. For the inequality equation, these 
control variables include tertiary enrolment ratio, trade openness, and 
the capital compensation share of information and communication 
technology (ICT) in the total capital compensation. These variables 
represent the traditional factors of inequality in the literature, including 
insufficient supply of high-skilled workers, globalization, and skill-
biased technological change, all of which drive the recent increase in 
inequality. Given the cointegration test of Pedroni (1999), the number of 
control variables is restricted in the present study. 
For the investment equation, the control variables include savings 
rate, central government debt, lending interest rate by banks, and trade 
openness. Except for lending interest, all variables are expressed as 
a percentage of GDP. These variables are traditional determinants of 
investment (Ndikumana 2000) and are non-stationary, as shown in the 
PURT results presented in the following section. The other determinants 
of investment, such as GDP growth and inflation, are excluded in the 
analysis due to their stationarity.5 The panel cointegration approach is 
robust to this omission, as discussed in the subsequent section.6 
For the growth equation, the control variables include log private 
investment per capita, tertiary enrolment ratio, log triadic patent stock 
per million populations, and trade openness. These variables represent 
the traditional production factors of physical capital, human capital, 
technology, and external factors, respectively. 
For the consumption equation, the control variables include log 
disposable income per capita, deposit interest rate, and trade openness. 
Log disposable income per capita was included, following the basic 
Keynesian consumption function. Deposit interest rate was included 
due to its possible influence on the consumption or savings decisions of 
households. Trade openness was also included to control the external 
factors and increase of consumption variety by foreign trade.
αi is the country fixed effect, δit denoted a country-specific linear 
trend, β represents the effect of labor market institutions on the 
dependent variable, and εit is an error term that is stationary if 
cointegration is present. If cointegration is present, then (β', γ')' denotes 
the cointegrating vector. Table 1 presents the detailed definitions of 
5 Appendix 1 presents the PURT results for these variables.  
6 However, these variables are used in checking the robustness.
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Table 1
Definitions of Variables anD sources of Data
Variable Definition Source
Top 10% income 
share
Share of top 10% income among 
national income (%)
World Wealth and 
Income Database (WID)
Adjusted wage share Compensation per employee as 





Gini coefficient Ratio of the area that lies between the 
line of equality and the Lorenz curve 





Log private GFCF per 
capita
Log of private gross fixed capital 
formation per capita (PPP, 2005 US$)
IMF
Log GDP per capita Log of expenditure-side real GDP at 
chained PPPs per capita (2011 US$)




Log of household final consumption 
expenditure per capita (PPP, 2016 US$)
World Bank
Minimum wage Ratio of national (or federal) minimum 
wage to median wages of full-time 
workers (%)
OECD Stat.
Union density Trade union density (%) OECD Stat.
Log disposable 
income per capita
Log of real household net disposable 
income per capita (PPP, 2016 US$)
OECD Stat.
Deposit interest rate Deposit interest rate paid by 
commercial or similar banks (%)
World Bank
Log real hourly 
minimum wage
Log of real hourly minimum wage (PPP, 
2015 US$)
OECD Stat.
ICT compensation Share of Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT) 




Trade openness Export + import/GDP (%) World Bank
Tertiary enrolment 
ratio
Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both 
sexes (%)
World Bank
Saving rate Gross saving as percent of GDP (%) World Bank





Central government debt as percent of 
GDP (%)
OECD Stat.
Log triadic patent 
stock per million 
population
Log of triadic patent stock per million 
populations
OECD Stat.
235LABOR MARKET INSTITUTIONS AND WAGE-LED GROWTH
these variables and the sources of data.
IV. Estimation Method
The panel cointegration methods were used to study the long-term 
effect of labor market institutions on the macroeconomic outcomes. 
Previous literatures tend to utilize country- or industry-level data and 
generally apply conventional econometric methods, such as panel fixed 
effect, generalized method of moments (GMM), or time series model. 
However, conventional models have problems, such as endogeneity 
or poor small sample property. Specifically, the sequential exogeneity 
assumption of independent variables in the GMM model cannot easily 
hold in the OECD panel data with a small number of countries.7 
Endogeneity can be controlled and the long-term effect can be estimated 
by using the panel cointegration method.8 
The empirical estimation can be divided into three steps, namely, 
PURT, panel cointegration test, and group-mean fully modified ordinary 
least squares (group-mean FMOLS). 
In the first step, the variables were checked whether they are 
stationary or non-stationary for the panel cointegration approach. Two 
widely used PURTs, namely, the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS) and 
Pesaran (2007) tests, were conducted. 
The IPS test uses the augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test in the 
panel setting with heterogeneous AR (1) coefficient. However, the IPS 
tests assume the cross-sectional independence of error term. To check 
whether a variable has cross-sectional dependence (CD), a CD test of 
Pesaran (2004) was performed. Rejection of the CD test suggests the 
existence of CD in a variable. In this case, the Pesaran (2007) test, 
which allows the CD of the error term, was used. The rejection of IPS 
and Pesaran (2007) tests suggests that the time series are stationary in 
at least one country.
In the second step, if the non-stationarity of variables is confirmed, 
then a panel cointegration test is conducted to determine whether a 
7 The reason is that the GMM estimator requires the number of cross-
sectional unit (n) to be large for asymptotic results. The GMM results presented 
in Appendix 2 show that the sequential exogeneity assumption is strongly 
rejected in all specifications. 
8 Similar discussions are in the study of Shin and Lee (2019).
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cointegration relationship exists between variables in the long run. 
The Pedroni (1995) cointegration test, which uses the individual ADF 
regression for the residuals of each country datum, was performed. The 
residual comes from individual OLS regression. After estimating the 
residual, the Pedroni cointegration test checks whether this residual is 
stationary. The null hypothesis of the Pedroni cointegration test is that 
cointegration does not exist, whereas its alternative hypothesis is that 
cointegration exists for all countries. 
In the third step, if the existence of cointegration is confirmed, then 
group-mean FMOLS can be applied to estimate the long-run coefficients. 
The group-mean FMOLS, which was developed by Pedroni (2001a, 
2001b), has two advantages. First, its convergence rate is T N , which 
is faster than the conventional N  convergence rate. Second, group-
mean FMOLS is robust to the omission of variables that are excluded 
in the cointegrating relationship (Pedroni 2007). Thus, omitting these 
stationary variables that might affect the dependent variable and be 
correlated to labor market institution variables will not present an issue 
because they cannot be part of the cointegrating relationship. 
V. Estimation Results
A. Panel Unit Root Test (PURT)
Table 2 presents the PURT results.
The data coverage of each variable is the widest coverage that is used 
in the following analysis. For example, given that trade openness is 
used in the inequality, investment, growth, and consumption equations, 
widest coverage means that any country which is included in the 
inequality, investment, growth, or consumption equation should be 
included in the PURT for trade openness. If the IPS or Pesaran (2007) 
tests do not reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity and if one 
variable is confirmed as non-stationary, then the smaller data coverage 
of the variable is also non-stationary because both tests posit in their 
null hypothesis that each time series of this variable is non-stationary. 
It decreases the burden on PURT. 
First, Table 2 shows that all PURT statistics for deposit interest rate 
are significant at the 1% level, thereby suggesting that deposit interest 
rate is stationary. Therefore, the deposit interest rate was excluded from 
the control variables for the consumption equation. 
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Table 2
Purt
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Note: ** and * denote statistical significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively.
* p-value is in the parenthesis
* null hypothesis: variable is non-stationary
*  IPS: lag length selection based on SIC, maximum lag length is observation-based, Newey-West automatic bandwidth 
selection and Bartlett kernel
* n. a.: not available due to limit of observations
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Second, Table 2 shows that the CD statistic for Gini coefficient is 
insignificant. Therefore, the IPS test is better than the Pesaran (2007) 
test for the Gini coefficient because the former has a better small 
sample property than the latter if the cross-sectional independence 
holds (Pesaran 2007). The IPS test results reject the null hypothesis 
at the 1% or 5% significance level. Thus, the Gini coefficient is also 
stationary, and the cointegration test results for this variable is no 
longer presented. 
Third, the CD test reveals a CD in all variables except for the Gini 
coefficient. The CD statistics are significant at the 1% level in all 
variables except for the Gini coefficient. Thus, the Pesaran (2007) test 
was performed for these variables instead of the IPS test.
In the Pesaran (2007) test, three lag structures of residual serial 
correlation were used, from no serial correlation to AR (2). The Pesaran 
(2007) test results show that tertiary enrolment ratio, minimum wage, 
log private GFCF per capita, savings rate, central government debt, and 
log disposable income per capita are non-stationary regardless of the 
lag structure or the existence of a linear trend. Thus, these variables 
are non-stationary. However, the Pesaran (2007) test generates mixed 
results for the remaining nine variables depending on the lag structure 
or the existence of linear trend. To investigate these results in detail, the 
Pesaran (2007) test was conducted for these variables up to five lags.
Table 3 shows that the Pesaran (2007) statistic and its p-value 
increase along with lag length for most variables, which indicates that 
the test statistics cannot reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity 
when sufficient lags of the residual are considered. These findings also 
imply that the significant statistics in lag 0 or 1 are most likely caused 
by the inappropriately short lag structure. When two or more lags of the 
residual are considered, the Pesaran (2007) statistics are insignificant 
for top 10% income share regardless of the existence of a linear trend. 
Thus, top 10% income share tends to be non-stationary. The Pesaran 
(2007) statistics are also insignificant for the other variables if the 
linear time trends and sufficient number of lags are controlled. Thus, 
these variables seem to be non-stationary data with a linear trend. 
Given that the country-specific linear time trend was used as a default 
control variable, these variables can be considered non-stationary in the 
following analysis.
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B. Cointegration Test 
The following tables present the results of the Pedroni cointegration 
test. 
Country-specific linear trend and country fixed effects were controlled 
in all specifications. Control variables are different based on the 
dependent variables and are presented in Section III. 
Each column in Table 4 shows the results of the cointegration test 
when one of the two labor variables is included in each specification.
The Pedroni cointegration test produces mixed results. Most of Group 
PP and ADF statistics are significant at 1% or 5% level, but most of 
other statistics are insignificant. Although the empirical power of Panel 
v and rho and Group rho is weak at a small-sized sample, most of Panel 
PP and ADF statistics, which have relatively high empirical power at a 
small-sized sample, are also insignificant.9 Results suggest that there 
is weak evidence that labor market institutions are cointegrated with 
macroeconomic outcomes in the long run. 
C. Robustness Check
Previous results suggest that labor market institutions, such as 
minimum wage or union density, do not have long-term relationship 
with macroeconomic outcomes. However, the effect of labor market 
institutions could vary with countries. Specifically, critics of wage-led 
growth theory often argued that it might not be effective for countries 
that heavily depend on external trade because the negative effect of 
minimum wage or union density on net export can be strong in these 
countries. Thus, the effect of labor market institutions on growth was 
estimated country by country in this section. Two estimation methods, 
9 Pedroni (2004) computed the empirical power of these statistics by 
conducting a Monte Carlo simulation and found that the power of v and rho 
statistics was poor for a small-sized sample similar to the present study. When 
N = T = 20 and the AR (1) coefficient of the residual is 0.9 (which indicates a 
stationary residual and the existence of cointegration), the empirical power 
of panel v and group rho statistics is near zero whereas that of the panel rho 
statistic is around 0.2 for the 5% test. However, the empirical power of PP and 
ADF statistics is around 0.6. Such empirical power increases along with N or 
T, and the difference in the power of statistics becomes negligible when T > 
70. Among all cases reported by Pedroni (2004), N = T = 20 is the closest to my 
sample. 
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namely, OLS and FMOLS, were used. Given that variables in the growth 
equation are non-stationary, first-differenced data were used for OLS 
estimation. When the results of Johansen cointegration test suggest 
a cointegration relationship10 among variables in the specific country, 
10 Johansen cointegration test was impossible for several countries due to the 
limit of observations. Results of Johansen cointegration test are available upon 
request to the author.
Table 4
PeDroni Panel cointegration test
Dependent 
variable




Log private GFCF 
per capita
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Note: ** and * denote statistical significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively
* p-value is in parenthesis
* Null hypothesis: No cointegration
* Linear country-specific trends and fixed effects are controlled.
* Use d. f. corrected Dickey-Fuller residual variances
*  Automatic lag length selection based on SIC with lags from 0 to observation-based maximum lag length
* Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
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country-specific FMOLS estimation was used for level data. When 
estimation results are different between OLS and FMOLS, FMOLS 
results were used because they can handle the endogeneity problem 
given the existence of cointegration as previously discussed.
Control variables are same as those in the previous panel cointegration 
tests and linear trend is controlled in the FMOLS estimation. Results of 
Table 5
country-by-country estimation results for growth equation
Dependent 
variable D. log GDP per capita Log GDP per capita




D. minimum age D. union density Minimum wage Union density
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Australia 0.002 (0.002) −0.013** (0.003) 0.001 (0.002) −0.015** (0.001)
Belgium 0.008 (0.007) 0.004 (0.005)
Canada −0.024** (0.003) −0.020** (0.004)
Czech Republic −0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.004)
Estonia −0.008 (0.004) −0.008 (0.011)
France −0.001 (0.003) 0.005 (0.017) −0.002 (0.003) 0.045 (0.032)
Greece −0.004 (0.003) −0.003 (0.006) −0.006** (0.001) −0.003 (0.002)
Ireland −0.002 (0.002) −0.022* (0.010)
Israel 0.069 (0.037) −0.174 (0.100)
Japan −0.001 (0.013) −0.018 (0.010)
Korea −0.002 (0.002) −0.010 (0.006) −0.003** (0.001) −0.013* (0.006)
Luxembourg −0.024* (0.011) 0.002 (0.010)
Netherlands −0.002 (0.002) −0.002 (0.006) −0.002 (0.002) −0.004 (0.003)
New Zealand −0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) −0.003 (0.003) −0.002 (0.001)
Poland −0.005** (0.001) −0.009** (0.002)
Portugal 0.006 (0.004) 0.002 (0.005)
Spain 0.004 (0.008) 0.008* (0.003) −0.002 (0.002) 0.015** (0.003)
UK −0.003 (0.010) 0.011 (0.024)
USA −0.002 (0.001) −0.009 (0.007) −0.002 (0.001) −0.008 (0.010)
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively
*  Constant, log private investment per capita, tertiary enrolment ratio, log triadic patent stock 
per million populations, and trade openness are omitted. 
* OLS: robust standard error used
*  FMOLS:  Linear trend is controlled, long-run covariance estimates: Bartlett kernel, Newey-
West fixed bandwidth, d. f. adjustment, one-year lag is used for Johansen cointegration test
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estimation country by country for growth equation are as follows.
Table 5 presents the estimation results for labor market institutions. 
Results for other variables were omitted to save space. The results are 
similar to previous estimation results. Most of the estimated coefficients 
for minimum wage and union density are insignificant or negatively 
significant. The only estimated coefficient that is positive and significant 
is union density in Spain. Minimum wage is significant and negative 
in Canada, Luxembourg, Poland, Greece, and Korea. Union density 
is significant and negative in Australia, Canada, Ireland, Poland, and 
Korea. 
Thus, estimation results do not seem to support wage-led growth 
theory. However, no tendency exists that the negative effect of minimum 
wage and union density on growth is strong for countries heavily 
dependent on external trade. Instead, Poland, Greece, and Korea have 
a relatively high share of self-employment.11 Thus, the negative effect of 
minimum wage on employment or working hours might be considerable 
in these countries because the self-employed or small business owners 
could be sensitive to the wage increase of their employees through 
minimum wage increase. Employers might try to recover profits by 
firing their temporary workers given the negative shock from minimum 
wage increase (Hosono et al. 2015).  
The effects of labor market institutions on private investment and 
consumption were estimated country by country as a robust check. 
Estimation results for investment equation are as follows.
Similar to Table 5, first-differenced data were used for OLS 
estimation, whereas level data were used for FMOLS estimation. For 
OLS estimation, two control variables, namely, inflation rate and growth 
rate of GDP per capita, were added. These variables were excluded 
in the previous sections due to their stationarity, but OLS estimation 
does not require non-stationarity of regressors; thus, including these 
variables as control variables is possible. These variables are stationary; 
hence, their level data were used. In the FMOLS estimation, these 
variables were excluded as before. 
Estimation results show that minimum wage is significantly and 
negatively correlated to private investment in Canada, Portugal, and 
11 The average share of self-employment among total employment from 1970 
to 2015 was 42.9% in Greece, 42.2% in Korea, and 26% in Poland, which are 
considerably higher than the OECD average (19%). Data are from the OECD. 
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Spain. In the Netherlands, the OLS estimator of minimum wage is 
positive and significant, but the FMOLS estimator is insignificant. 
Union density is negative and significant in Canada and Slovakia, but it 
is positive and significant in Spain for FMOLS estimation. 
Estimation results for consumption are as follows.
For OLS estimation, deposit interest rate, which was excluded in the 
previous section due to its stationarity, was added as a control variable. 
In the FMOLS estimation, deposit interest rate was excluded as before. 
Table 6
country-by-country estimation results for inVestment equation
Dependent 
variable D. log private investment per capita Log private investment per capita




D. minimum wage D. union density Minimum wage Union density
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Australia −0.005 (0.008) 0.004 (0.016)
Canada 0.014 (0.010) −0.021** (0.007) −0.013** (0.004) −0.026** (0.005)
Czech Republic 0.020 (0.012) 0.014 (0.017)
Estonia 0.006 (0.009) −0.040 (0.010)
France −0.001 (0.005) 0.023 (0.038)
Greece 0.028 (0.030) 0.040 (0.032)
Japan −0.030 (0.024) 0.054 (0.062)
Korea 0.011 (0.010) 0.023 (0.036)
Netherlands 0.008* (0.003) 0.001 (0.006) 0.013 (0.008) −0.001 (0.008)
New Zealand 0.110 (0.049) −0.064 (0.018)
Poland 0.000 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006)
Portugal −0.026** (0.008) −0.010 (0.009) −0.038** (0.009) 0.010 (0.005)
Slovakia 0.008 (0.015) −0.036* (0.011)
Spain −0.011 (0.009) −0.012 (0.006) −0.043** (0.013) 0.045** (0.016)
UK 0.063 (0.053) 0.125 (0.163)
USA −0.003 (0.003) 0.017 (0.032) −0.006 (0.005) −0.027 (0.024)
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively
* Constant and other control variables are omitted
*  OLS: robust standard error used, control variables: D. saving rate, D. lending interest rate, D. 
central government debt, D. trade openness, GDP per capita growth, inflation
*  FMOLS: Long-run covariance estimates: Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth, d. f. 
adjustment, one-year lag is used for Johansen test, control variables: linear trend, saving 
rate, lending interest rate, central government debt, trade openness
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Estimation results show that the minimum wage is significantly and 
positively correlated to private consumption in Greece and Poland, but 
significant and negative in Canada, Hungary, and Korea. In Belgium, 
minimum wage is significant and positive for OLS estimation, but 
insignificant for FMOLS estimation. 
Thus, minimum wage is positively correlated to consumption in two 
or three countries, which casts doubt on the thought that wage-led 
growth theory generally works. Minimum wage was significantly and 
positively correlated to private consumption per capita in Greece and 
Poland, but significantly and negatively correlated to GDP per capita in 
these countries. Thus, the increase in minimum wage might increase 
private consumption, but these effects might be insufficient to increase 
GDP. In Korea and Canada, minimum wage was negatively and 
significantly correlated to private consumption per capita and GDP per 
capita. Hence, if the minimum wage increase fails to increase private 
consumption, then the chance that wage-led growth theory actually 
works is small. Similar analysis was conducted from Tables 5 to 7 using 
log real hourly minimum wage, but the results are similar. Log real 
hourly minimum wage was insignificant for most countries.12
Union density is significant and negative in Australia, Hungary, and 
Spain, but significant and positive in the Netherlands and Portugal in 
Table 7. 
The effect of union density in Spain is opposite to what wage-led 
growth theory argues. Union density is positively and significantly 
correlated to the GDP and private investment, but negatively correlated 
to private consumption in Spain. 
Spain is an unusual case which did not show decrease in union 
density since the 1980s. Union density in Spain actually increased from 
13.5% in 1980 to 16.9% in 2013. This increase might affect estimation 
results for Spain. This unusual pattern of Spanish union density might 
come from its late democratization after the death of dictator Francisco 
Franco in 1975. Union density was at its peak in the 1960s and 1970s 
and deceased consistently for most of OECD countries since the 1980s 
due to globalization and liberalization, but Spanish union density 
was at its peak in 1998 due to its late democratization process. Thus, 
12 Estimation results using log real hourly minimum wage are available upon 
request to the author.
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the increase in trend of union density in Spain can generate a strong 
correlation between union density and GDP or investment, which might 
affect the estimation results for GDP and investment. 
Table 7
country-by-country estimation results for consumPtion equation
Dependent 
variable D. log private consumption per capita Log private consumption per capita




D. minimum wage D. union density Minimum wage Union density
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Australia 0.002 (0.002) −0.001 (0.003) 0.003 (0.001) −0.005** (0.001)
Belgium 0.007** (0.002) 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
Canada 0.002 (0.005) −0.004* (0.001) −0.006* (0.002) −0.006 (0.003)
Czech Republic −0.003 (0.003) 0.002 (0.007) −0.004 (0.003) −0.002 (0.004)
Estonia −0.001 (0.005) −0.005 (0.017)
France 0.001 (0.002) −0.030 (0.017) 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.007)
Greece 0.011* (0.004) −0.016 (0.009) 0.004** (0.001) −0.006 (0.003)
Hungary −0.002 (0.001) −0.001 (0.006) −0.004* (0.001) −0.007** (0.002)
Japan −0.003 (0.009) −0.007 (0.005)
Korea −0.003 (0.005) 0.020 (0.025) −0.007* (0.003) 0.029 (0.016)
Mexico −0.001 (0.004) 0.012 (0.007)
Netherlands −0.000 (0.003) 0.006 (0.006) −0.001 (0.002) 0.025* (0.009)
New Zealand −0.001 (0.005) −0.005 (0.007)
Poland −0.000 (0.001) 0.004 (0.003) 0.003* (0.001) 0.006 (0.003)
Portugal −0.003 (0.005) 0.013 (0.010) 0.000 (0.002) 0.015** (0.003)
Slovakia −0.005 (0.005) 0.008 (0.007) 0.004 (0.005) −0.002 (0.004)
Spain −0.008 (0.004) −0.077** (0.016)
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively
* Constant and other control variables are omitted
* OLS:  robust standard error used, control variables: D.log disposable income per capita, D. 
trade openness, deposit interest rate
* FMOLS:  Long-run covariance estimates: Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth, d. f. 
adjustment, one-year lag is used for Johansen test, control variables: linear trend, 
log disposable income per capita, trade openness
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VI. Conclusion
This study investigates the long-term relationship between labor 
market institutions and macroeconomic variables, such as inequality, 
investment, growth, and consumption. Previous studies on wage-
led growth have tested the effect of wage share on growth by using 
time series techniques (Onaran and Galanis 2012; Onaran and Obst 
2016). However, given that wage share is not a policy variable, how 
the policies from wage-led growth theory function in practice remains 
unknown. Meanwhile, this study tests the effect of minimum wage and 
union density, which are representative policies for wage-led growth, 
to show the long-term effects. In addition, this study applies improved 
econometric methods to analyze the long-term effects using panel 
cointegration approach. 
The estimation results provide weak support for the argument of 
wage-led growth strategy. Minimum wage and union density are not 
robustly correlated to any macroeconomic outcomes in the long run. 
When country-by-country estimations are used, a small number of 
countries show significant correlation between labor market institutions 
and GDP, investment, or consumption. 
Various reasons may explain why minimum wage is not robustly 
correlated to consumption in the long run. First, increasing the 
minimum wage may decrease employment or working hours per 
employee (Bazen and Marimoutou 2002; Burkhauser et al. 2000; 
Stewart and Swaffield 2002, 2008). Increased minimum wage may have 
a negative effect on employment because employers can adjust labor 
easily by adopting new technologies or increasing the capital-labor 
ratio in the long-run. If an increase in minimum wage cannot drive 
an increase in wage share by reducing employment or working hours 
per employee, then the main channel for wage-led growth does not 
work. This finding is in line with the estimation results for the effect of 
minimum wage on labor income share because these variables have no 
cointegration relationship, as shown in Table 4. This finding can also 
explain why minimum wage is insignificant to private consumption for 
most of countries in the Table 7.
Second, the effect of minimum wage on labor income share can 
be minimal even if the increase in minimum wage drives an increase 
in labor income share because a small share of workers in total 
employment is affected by minimum wage. The share of workers 
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affected by minimum wage in total employment is less than 20% at 
most because minimum wage relative to median wage is less than two 
thirds at most and the self-employed is not covered by minimum wage.13 
Thus, the share of wage for affected workers in the total GDP tends to 
be small and can minimize the effect of minimum wage on labor income 
share even if minimum wage does not affect the employment and 
working hours per employee.14
The same reasons may explain why minimum wage is not robustly 
correlated to investment in the long run. However, in this study, 
minimum wage has an economy-wide effect on investment, and this 
effect may be highly robust for those firms or sectors that heavily 
depend on low-wage labor (i.e., small firms, retailers, or restaurants). 
Similar reasons may also explain why union density is not robustly 
correlated to investment in the long run. Nickell and Layard (1999) 
stated that the establishment of a cooperative relationship between 
union and management may be a more important factor for investment 
and productivity than the simple density of union.
In sum, these estimation results suggest that minimum wage and 
union density may not be good policy instruments for equality and 
growth in the long run and that wage-led growth theory may not have 
a strong empirical basis. Furthermore, estimation results in Table 5 
suggest that the effect of minimum wage on GDP tends to be negative 
for countries that have a high share of self-employment, such as 
Greece, Korea, and Poland. 
Nevertheless, the criticisms directed toward wage-led growth theory 
lack strong empirical basis because the negative effect of minimum 
13 For example, the share of workers affected by minimum wage in total 
employment in Korea gradually increased from 0.65% in 2001 to 13% in 2016. In 
the US, the share is between 1.15% and 7.54% from 1979 to 2014 (U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics 2017). OECD (2015) also showed that the share is less than 
15% in all 20 OECD countries in 2010. 
14 The ratio of minimum wage to median wage is 48% on average in the 26 
OECD countries where data from 1970 are available. Therefore, the share of 
wage for affected workers in the total labor income is likely to be less than 10% 
because the share of workers affected by minimum wage in the total number of 
employees is less than 20% at most. Furthermore, the share of adjusted wage in 
the total GDP is 64% on average in 31 OECD countries since 1970, which means 
that the share of wage for affected workers in the total GDP is likely to be less 
than 6.4%.
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wage and union density on investment and GDP is not robust. 
Many governments and scholars have recently shown interest in 
wage-led growth theory and minimum wage, but the results of this 
study imply that the policy instruments for simultaneously achieving 
long-term equality and growth are difficult to find. 
However, given that this study focuses on the long-term effect of labor 
market institutions, an increase in minimum wage or union density 
may possibly lead to an increase in GDP in the short run similar to 
other Keynesian effective demand policies.
This study uses OECD country data from the 1970s, but additional 
countries or time series data must be considered in future studies to 
conduct a further powerful panel cointegration analysis. Research using 
micro-data, such as firm or individual data, can also be conducted to 
understand the effect of labor market institutions in detail. 
Appendix 
1. Results of PURT for Selected Variables
appendix Table 1
Purt for growth rates of gDP Per caPita, gross caPital formation (gcf, 
% of gDP), inflation, anD log real hourly minimum wage (PPP, 2015 us$)
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Note: ** and * denote statistical significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively
* Data:  GDP growth, GCF: 34 countries, 1970-2007, inflation: 27 countries, 1975-2010, real 
hourly minimum wage: 8 countries, 1970-2007
* p-value is in the parenthesis
* Null hypothesis: variable is non-stationary
* IPS:  lag length selection based on SIC, maximum lag length is observation-based, Newey-West 
automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel
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2. Results of GMM Estimation
appendix Table 2
results of gmm estimation
Dependent 
variable
Top 10% income 
share
Adjusted wage 
share GCF GDP growth 
Private 
consumption 
share (% of GDP)
Variable Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
Minimum wage −0.209** 0.003 0.085 0.444 −0.096** 0.008 0.013 0.491 0.095 0.146
Union density −0.101 0.213 0.002 0.983 0.032 0.458 −0.029 0.110 0.081 0.162
Trade openness 0.009 0.812 −0.027 0.435 −0.005 0.747 0.015** 0.000 −0.093** 0.000
Tertiary 
enrolment ratio
0.073 0.070 −0.030 0.762 - - −0.001 0.917 - -
ICT 
compensation
0.335 0.433 0.605 0.086 - - - - - -
Saving rate - - - - 0.414** 0.000 - - - -
Lending interest 
rate - - - -
−0.048* 0.018 - - - -
Deposit interest 
rate - - - - - -
0.185** 0.000
Central 
government debt - - - -
−0.029 0.069 - - - -
Inflation - - - - 0.249** 0.002 - - - -
GDP growth - - - - 0.743* 0.018 - - 0.357 0.321
Log triadic patent 
stock per million - - - -
- - 0.275 0.109 - -
GCF - - - - - - 0.142** 0.002 - -
Lag of log GDP 
per capita - - - -
- - −2.462* 0.016 - -
Number of 
observations
42 55 73 105 116
Number of 
countries




4.67 5 3.3 4.4 4.8 
AR (2) 0.291 0.391 0.403 0.332 0.488
Sargan p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Note: ** and * denote statistical significance levels at 1% and 5%, respectively
*  Five-year average data is used. Averaging is applied if at least three observations on a country are within a 
certain period
* Constant and period dummies are omitted
* Robust standard error is used
* One-step system GMM estimator used
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